托尼布莱尔全球变革研究所：2022年软件和硬件战争建设人工智能战争的智能动力（英文版）（18页）.pdf

1、Software and HardWar:BuildingIntelligent Power forArtificiallyIntelligent WarfarePETE FURLONGMELANIE GARSONJEEGAR KAKKADExecutive Summary 3Innovating Warfare 5The Hardware-Software Balance of Power in the UkraineConflict 6Increased Capability=Increased Vulnerability 11Intelligent Power for Intellige

2、nt Warfare 14ContentsPublished at https:/institute.global/policy/software-and-hard-war-building-intelligent-power-artificially-intelligent-warfare onNovember 18 2022The conflict in Ukraine has played out in ways that few predicted at the outset,with the Russian militaryseemingly outmanoeuvred by a U

3、krainian defence that is more adaptable and better equipped thananticipated.Ukraines performance has highlighted the gaps in operational capacity in even the mostadvanced militaries,providing lessons for emerging digital economies as well as established militarypowers on how to work with tech compan

4、ies for more agile access to the most cutting-edge capabilities.While the outcome of the war may still be far from guaranteed,the combat so far demonstrates theclear links between technology policy and military strategy.This conflict,which was predicted to be thefirst cyber war,has brought to the fo

5、re a new,more intricate and holistic theatre of war in which the linesbetween the civilian and military-industrial complex have become blurred,where commercial entities fillresource gaps faster than countries,where semiconductor engineers are the new rocket scientists andwhere data security can tip

6、the balance of power.The multistakeholder approach to arming the Ukrainian and Russian armies is heralding a new age of“drone diplomacy”.Alongside the commercial entities that have been filling the gaps,countries such asIran and Turkey are vying to leverage their geopolitical influence,benefitting f